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Klein & Barron’s (2016) argument by analogy can be paraphrased as follows: 
 
(1) Cortex isn’t necessary for phenomenal “what it is like” consciousness, since a 
cognitive information processing system that functions very much like the vertebrate 
midbrain suffices. 
 




(3) Insects are conscious. 
 
Assuming this interpretation is basically right and the premises are true, this seems to be a 
strong argument. Are the premises correct? I will defer to others when it comes to assessing the 
second premise and confine my remarks to the first. Is (1) true, and do Klein & Barron offer a 
compelling case for thinking it is true? My answers are: “probably not” and “certainly not.” 
 
Rather than commit to a full-blown philosophical theory, or even definite criteria for ascribing 
consciousness, Klein & Barron direct the reader to research they claim shows that “[e]mergence 
from anaesthesia … and coma or vegetative state” is “predicted by the reengagement of 
subcortical structures” (p. 3). They also offer Merker’s (2007) account of the specific processing 
mechanisms in conscious awareness and cite assurances lent by other authorities that “the basic 
capacity for subjective awareness is supported by subcortical structures” (p. 3). Yet supporting 
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subjective awareness is not the same as being minimally sufficient. These points accordingly call 
for more scrutiny and reflection.    
 
Some of the works Klein & Barron cite are at best irrelevant to assessment of the first premise, 
and actually seem to establish its negation! Consider Schiff (2010), who certainly attends to 
subcortical structures in recovery from brain injury, but does not completely dismiss the cortex. 
Cortical regions, especially the anterior cingulate, posited to “play an essential role” (p. 4), are 
included by Schiff within a proposed “mesocircuit” which is granted “central importance” (p. 7) 
in understanding improved awareness and responsiveness (p. 4; fig. 3). I do not necessarily wish 
to endorse Schiff’s view, but only to note that he makes no suggestion that subcortical 
mechanisms on their own are sufficient for phenomenal consciousness and cautions about 
“significant ambiguity” when diagnosing its presence or absence in seemingly vegetative 
patients (p. 1). The case studies mentioned by Schiff, and indeed Schiff’s own work with 
minimally conscious patients all attest to the contribution of cortical structures (Schiff et al. 
2005). Similarly, Långsjö et al. (2012) found that “minimal cortical activity is necessary” (p. 4940) 
and that linked subcortical and cortical regions, including “the anterior cingulate cortex … and 
portions of the lateral orbital frontal and parietal lobes” (p. 4938) constitute the “minimal neural 
correlates required for a conscious state to emerge” (p. 4935). Herbet et al. (2014, p. 241) found 
that experimental interference with the posterior cingulate cortex resulted in loss of 
responsiveness and awareness of the external environment, with the patient reportedly 
undergoing an altered dream-like state. Mashour et al.’s (2013) review of current research 
proposes that the “neural core for primitive consciousness” (p. 10361) depends at least in part 
on cortical activity, especially from the anterior cingulate, and perhaps “limited neocortical 
involvement” in the form of frontal-parietal network activity (Ibid.). 
 
Making sense of all these results is not my aim, and I agree that it is unclear how exactly 
consciousness, in all its various forms, depends on the cortex. But by these evidentiary 
standards we ought to infer that subcortical structures merely provide support and reject Klein 
& Barron’s premise.  
 
Klein & Barron’s PNAS article, Barron & Klein (2016), does provide a fuller treatment of their first 
premise. Some of those arguments once again conflate the midbrain on its own with activity of 
“frontocorticostriatopallidal-thalamocortical loop frontal systems” (Schiff, 2010, p. 5). I will 
focus, however, on other sources they mention, including Merker (2005) — who is claimed to 
provide “evidence of preserved consciousness even in patients who lack a cortex” — and 
various other authors in support of the view that “even massive cortical damage seems to spare 
subjective experience” (Barron & Klein, 2016, p. 4901). An overview and assessment of this 
evidence comes next. 
 
Although Merker (2005) points to certain cortically blind patients reporting “bare awareness” 
despite the absence of normal visual consciousness (p. 101), the inference that only midbrain 
structures are implicated is unwarranted. Such “type 2” blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1986/98) either 
depends on preserved islands of striate cortex (Radovea et al., 2008), or if not V1, then other 
regions of visual cortex, such as V5/MT (Ffythche & Zeki, 2011; see also Brogaard, 2015, pp. 93-
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4). Either way, the neuroanatomical basis of blindsight cannot be mistaken for evidence that 
midbrain structures alone are sufficient for conscious awareness.  
 
Among the other works Barron & Klein (2016) mention as offering “good evidence” (p. 4901) are 
Damasio & Carvalho (2013), Philippi et al. (2012), Owen et al. (2002), Klein & Hohwy (2015), and 
Merker (2007). While this piling on of sources looks impressive, the plasterwork crumbles upon 
closer examination. 
 
Key (2016) has expressed reservations about the one, possibly anomalous “Patient B” discussed 
by Damasio et al. (2012) and Damasio & Carvalho (2013), noting that they concede that 
persisting “cortical regions associated with pain … remain undamaged” and that this might 
explain the patient’s experiences (Key, 2016, p. 10). In reply, Merker (2016, p. 6) counters that 
this case should be accorded more weight because it involved a rare bilateral lesion. Following 
Devor et al. (2014), Merker finds it implausible that surviving cortex could stand in for the 
damaged “major node.” Although these points are well taken, the role of cortex in pain is far 
from settled, and in light of the fact that the observations of Patient B were made in the 
absence of quantitative testing or imaging (Key, 2016, p. 10), the case remains intriguing, but 
inconclusive. Meanwhile, Barron & Klein (2016) cite a book chapter as if it offered “evidence of 
residual conscious awareness” due to “preserved subcortical structures” (p. 4901) in 
nonresponsive patients, but it offers no data and says almost nothing on the matter (maybe I 
missed something?). It is at least of some use, however, insofar as it points out that the 
heterogeneity of individuals and difficulties in interpreting behavior suggest that confidence in 
one-off patient studies can be inordinate (Klein & Hohwy, 2016, p. 250)! 
 
Barron & Klein’s remaining examples are also underwhelming. Concerning Philippi et al. (2012), 
the authors themselves write that while their findings are compatible with the hypothesis that 
cortical activity is not needed, they are also compatible with the possibility that persisting 
regions of cortex “constitute the critical substrate” for aspects of the patient’s awareness (2012, 
p. 14). That the single patient in question had made a recovery through changes in cortical 
functioning likewise cannot be ignored (Ibid.). As for Owen et al. (2002), they acknowledge that 
testing revealed significant residual cortical activity in comatose patients in response to visual 
and auditory stimulation (p. 398). Finally, I consider Merker (2007) alongside Merker (2008) and 
Aleman and Merker (2014). These articles turn on the issue of certain hydranencephalic infants 
who, despite the apparent absence of functional cerebral cortex, produce an expressive 
behavioral repertoire including smiling, laughing, orienting, learning and recognizing. 
 
Key (2016) has responded to Merker, claiming that hydranenephalic children are typically 
vegetative, with only occasional exceptions. As “most of these children still possess some 
cerebral cortex” perhaps “those with more overt behaviours could have more functional cortical 
tissue” (p. 8). Merker (2007) is dismissive of this suggestion, emphasizing that the “physical 
presence [of cortical tissue] … need not mean … it is even locally functional” (p. 78). Merker 
(2007) also contests the claim that “incapacity and unresponsiveness” is the norm, noting that 
with proper care such a child can “survive for years and even decades” (p. 79). In an effort to 
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address the “lack of formal survivorship data” (Merker, 2008, p. 213), he provides evidence that 
“quality of care” (Ibid.) may be the decisive factor when it comes to life expectancy. 
 
I am persuaded that we should tread very carefully regarding the question of whether children 
commonly designated as hydranencephalic can be far more capable than is generally assumed, 
and in some cases, even phenomenally aware (Merker, 2007; Beshkar, 2008; Aleman & Merker, 
2014). What is less certain is whether informal observation can be trusted to deliver judgments 
about a total absence of cortical resources in specific individuals, as several urged in their BBS 
commentaries on Merker (2007). On this score, Merker agreed that his “summary account is a 
preliminary one and in no way definitive” (p. 114). While these and other works open up 
important lines for further inquiry, within the context of justifying Klein & Barron’s first premise, 




Despite these reservations, I look forward to others finding merit in Klein & Barron’s arguments 
for the second premise. It would be a service if they succeeded in building the case for a 
comparison between insect central complex functioning and the vertebrate midbrain. This work 
might be of use to philosophers and cognitive scientists on several counts, not least for those 
interested in “multiple realizability.” They might have also strengthened the proposal I made in 
Allen-Hermanson (2008) that dissociated sensory awareness can be used to argue that insects 
are “natural zombies.” Since then I’ve worried over whether the analogy between insect 
sensation and primate blindsight could be based on crude behavioral criteria, since disparities in 
gross anatomy might suggest that any such comparison is superficial. Klein & Barron might have 
filled this hole in my argument, though if so they have helped to show that the boundary of 
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